INTRODUCTION AND ARGUMENT
For later generations, August 1914 has become a watershed in monetary history. In a matter of days, the belligerent and neutral countries of Europe alike suspended the gold standard. The international monetary regime that had served the world economy for close to four decades was no more. Everywhere domestic fiat money became the order of the day.
Even more importantly, the war brought a fundamental change in the priorities of monetary policy: National objectives triumphed over monetary stability.
In a technical sense the change of 1914 involved a substitution of a gold-backed currency with either a currency backed by less liquid or lower quality assets or a fully fledged fiat currency. In either case, the direct link between international money and domestic currency was removed. Beyond the symbolic importance of gold and the question of credibility, this was not necessarily a very dramatic move with regard to policy implications.
Several countries, notably Italy and Spain, had maintained relatively stable fiat monies before the war. Moreover, for most countries the gold standard involved some kind of managed system, both with regard to the domestic currency and the use of foreign exchange reserves.
Thus, the dramatic move was arguably not the removal of the external anchor, but rather the changed political priorities.
Monetary policy under the gold standard had as its foremost priority to maintain monetary stability and the gold convertibility of the domestic currency. Only when these objectives were met, would central banks have the freedom to pursue a broader set of policy concerns, for instance adapting to the state of the business cycle. For the advanced countries of the Atlantic economy the gold commitment was seldom or never at risk. However, the limited policy freedom this created did not translate into a room for any radical experiments.
With the coming of war, policy priorities changed fundamentally. From a situation where the ideal was central bank independence, monetary policy now became subject to a new set of overall national objectives. For the belligerent countries, the overall objective became to win the war or in some cases just to avoid annihilation. With the very existence of a nation at risk and all national resources mobilised for the war effort, monetary stability became a concern of the second order.
Even though many contemporary observers felt that the outbreak of a general European war represented the end of an era, the view of 1914 as a watershed in monetary history is a perception created with the benefit of hindsight; by scholars who knew the true cost of the Great War, the fundamental change in society that the war led to and the futile attempt to restore a liberal international order in the economic turmoil of the interwar decades.
Central bankers in 1914 could neither foresee the length of the coming war nor the fundamental economic changes that it would bring about. Rather, the perspective in 1914 was that the outbreak of war warranted a temporary suspension of gold convertibility which would be restored in due time with the return to peace. Arguably, such a temporary suspension might even be considered to be within the normative structure of the gold standard if the commitment of monetary authorities to return to gold at the first viable moment was intact.
1 Thus, at least from the onset, the role of central banks during the war seemed to be to weather the storm, support the nation and wait for the inevitable return to normality. As time went by and the war dragged on, the belief in a swift return might have come under pressure.
Nevertheless, a proper understanding of the impact that the war had on monetary policy would be reserved for the future. Thus, in assessing monetary policy during the war the point of departure ought to be the mindset and outlook of contemporary central bankers, rather than what we know today.
Although outside the European carnage, the impact of war on the economies of neutral Europe was forceful. Open economies were hurt by the collapse of the international regime for trade and payments and had to adapt to a new set of rules created by the major countries at war. The general shortage of goods and the redirection of production for war purposes created Hermod Skånland catches the problem nicely with his claim that the emphasis on the 1920s
gives "the impression that it is the washing-up after the party that creates accidents".
3 By contributing to closing the gap, this study will give new insights into both the war experience and help provide a better contextual framework for understanding what came after.
In our study we move beyond the established accounts, characterised by condemnatory hindsight and a narrow emphasis on the impact of war. The wartime monetary experience ought to be seen as an intricate interplay between the challenges created by the war and the intellectual constraints embedded in the pre-war practice and thinking of the central bank. In short, we argue that the war created a new set of political imperatives that represented a fundamental breach both with traditional central banking and the prevailing ideas of limited government and balanced budgets. The latter was first and foremost associated with the huge public provisions programmes in order to maintain an adequate level of supplies and the government's move into the traditional market sphere of the economy, both contributing to substantial budget deficit throughout the war years. The central bank, Norges Bank, responded to these new imperatives and accommodated the increased demand for credit both from government and business. However, the adoption of these new imperatives did not lead to a fundamental change in the thinking of Norges Bank, which throughout the war remained firmly rooted in its pre-war experience. Nor did the massive monetary expansion create awareness of any inherent dangers. Built on the pre-war experience, increased inflation was seen as a business cycle phenomenon related to the war and the good fortunes of the Norwegian export sectors. As long as the central bank remained prudent and discounted bills that represented real commercial transactions; i.e. the real bill doctrine, inflation was not regarded as a monetary phenomenon. In consequence, when the central bank witnessed the staggering growth in her outstanding liabilities and the falling purchasing power during the war years, she was not overly worried because she could not identify any casual link between her own policy and monetary growth. In other words, the war policy thereby became a question of just weathering the storm and waiting for the inevitable return to normality. No policy was adopted to counterbalance the strong expansionist tendency connected to the new imperatives: windfall foreign exchange revenues were not sterilised, open market operations bringing down the monetary overhang were not carried out and the bank rate was kept within the normal range. The result turned out to be sorrows for the years to come. 
THE NORWEGIAN PREWAR GOLD STANDARD EXPERIENCE
Norway adhered to the classical gold standard from its introduction in 1874 to its demise at the dawn of World War I. Norges Bank, honoured notes in gold and the commitment to convertibility was never questioned. The gold standard coincided with long periods of economic growth, increase in international trade and economic modernisation.
Adherence facilitated trade, capital imports and integration in international financial markets.
As such, the gold standard in the case of Norway can easily be described as a success story.
The creation of the independent monetary system was more turbulent than the later gold standard experience. Norges Bank had been established in 1816 -in the wake of monetary chaos of the Napoleonic wars -to provide a stable domestic currency. Although de jure linked to silver, currency convertibility was not achieved until 1842 when Norges Bank began honouring its own notes in specie at par. Thus, for almost three decades after independence in 1814, the Norwegian monetary system was de facto based on paper money.
However, it is misguided to equate the system with pure fiat money. uncertainty over the future of the new state, the element of fiat must have been strong. In fact, the establishment of Norges Bank itself must be seen as an act of political fiat, backed only by the political necessity of establishing a national currency independent of Sweden, the major country in the dual monarchy, on the hope that it would be possible to get the citizens to contribute, by way of forced subscription, to the reserves of the bank. 5 However, throughout the 1820s and 1830s the element of fiat was strongly reduced. Starting in 1822, Norges Bank, committed to honour notes in silver, although at a hefty (47 %) discount. 6 Thus, the commitment created a floor for how far the value of notes could fall in terms of bullion.
During two decades of prolonged deflationary policies the discount was gradually reduced until silver convertibility at par was established. Even after 1842 the domestic circulation continued to be dominated by notes, with bullion mainly reserved for settling international
claims. This continued to be the case also after the successful 1874 move to the gold standard.
Although Norway adhered to the gold standard, her experience was far removed from the text book version of the gold standard captured in the phrase "the rules of the game." The text book version held that central banks were chiefly concerned with defending the gold convertibility of notes. Thus, any outflow of gold would be met by a curbing of domestic lending in order to reduce the circulating volume of notes. In this manner the central bank was supposed to strengthen the automatic adjustment process of the price-specie flow mechanism.
Both in terms of theoretical understanding and actual practice, central banking in Norway in this period was more sophisticated.
The principal objective of monetary policy under the gold standard was to maintain the convertibility of notes into gold on demand. Derived from this objective, Norges Bank had two key equally important roles, to preserve the nation's reserves of gold and foreign exchange and simultaneously to manage the domestic money supply. foreign trade and the employment of the merchant marine. The influence during the war was so strong that one scholar has argued that Norway in fact was Britain's "neutral ally". 14 Both responded by imposing restrictions; private banks by restricting the amount allowed to be withdrawn, the central bank by applying the traditional "small means", i.e. honouring demands for gold, but paying out only at one counter and only after counting each coin very carefully. In addition to this, the bank rate was increased twice, from 5 to 6 percent on July 31 and to 6.5 percent on August 3. Nevertheless, the subsequent day the government, withprotests from Norges Bank, responded to the panic by temporary suspending the gold convertibility of notes. The following weeks the note circulation went steadily down and the bank rate was reduced to 5.5 percent as early as on August 20.
Before the war Norway had been and exponent of the liberal "night watchman" state with limited intervention in the market. 15 The war came to serve as a catalyst for a changed Keilhaug, 1927 p 11-14, Farmand 1914 However, the public sector had played a key role in providing communication infrastructure and had in the last decade before the war tightened the control over the exploitation of hydro electrical power.
role for the state in the economy. Some of these changes were of temporary nature; others were retained after the war. Most important was the change in mindset, the set of expectation people harboured with respect to which questions the state might address. From the outset the most important trigger for increased intervention was the difficult supply situation. The governmental provision commission set up in the autumn of 1914 soon became a key instrument to secure necessary imports. With the supply situation deteriorating throughout, the war public purchases turned even more important. The government regulated imports, exports and the domestic exchange of goods, and intervened in the price setting. Moreover, the government obtained the right to intervene in production of goods and introduced purchase monopolies, notably for fats and grain.
The first casualty of war is financial discipline. In Norway, the war resulted in the division of government finances in two separated spheres. The ordinary budget was voted by parliament every year and followed the orthodox pre-war patterns of detailed listing of all expenditures. Due to the strong increase in tax-revenues the annual accounts displayed a healthy surplus. However, all extraordinary expenditures related to the war, including the government provision programmes and the government commercial activities was entered in the accounts as advances on future income. Moreover, these expenditures were beyond the ordinary scrutiny of parliament as the government believed they fell under a general warrant obtained by parliament at the outset of the war. The accounts were not consolidated under the war and first well into the 1920s was a full record of the extraordinary expenses published.
Needless to say government finances during the war lost control and was dominated by a continued stream of ad-hoc solutions. In consequences, the government debt that had stood at 357 million kroner on 30 June 1914 five year later had reached 1008 million kroner.
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Closely associated with the rise in government power and intervention were the bottleneck problems and the need to reach an understanding with the United Kingdom. In the beginning, the Norwegian government, fearful of undermining her own neutrality, did not enter into formal trade agreements with Britain. Instead, representatives of various industry organisations -in exchange for promises of supplies -guaranteed that their products would not be exported to Germany. Firms that violated the agreement ran the risk of being blacklisted and denied further supplies. These industry agreements covered most of the British-Norwegian trade and were later supplement by the government through direct export bans. In order to pre-emptive German purchases, the British in 1915 started to buy up fish.
However, under the influence of the increased fish prices this policy proved very costly. 1819 -2003 , Norges Bank Occasional Papers No. 35, Oslo, 2004 continued to show signs of booming conditions even after 1916, the character of the boom shifted from export-driven, to more domestically driven, powered by a strong speculative element.
The Norwegian war economy led to a peculiar atmosphere. On the one hand there was the feverish optimism of the export industries, particularly shipping, and the high expectations of the jobbing bonanza. On the other hand there were industries that had to crumble under the difficult supply situation, the deteriorating supply of foodstuff and the very unequal distribution of the spoils of being a neutral country in a time of war. For many living on fixed income, the inflation led to lower standards of living, while others who saw their purchasing power increase had problems attaining the goods to spend them on.
Although the domestic scene was complicated, the outward image of Norway was one of strength: A healthy balance of trade, gold pouring into the coffers of Norges Bank at a high rate and even more impressive private balances being accumulated abroad. Having left the golden fetters, the Norwegian krone from the autumn of 1915 was quoted above sterling and even above the US dollar, the only major gold backed currency left, for the rest of the war.
The problems that the economy faced, including the high price level, was a by-product of the war and would be removed with the coming of peace. This was a misleading image. By 1920 the krone was down to just half its pre-war value in international foreign exchange markets.
Nonetheless, the image of strength had bearings on Norwegian decision-makers. It is time to turn to turn to monetary development.
MONETARY DEVELOPMENT 1914 DEVELOPMENT -1918 The development of the key monetary variables during the war is mapped in figure 1 above. The impression is one of massive monetary expansion. The money stock (M2) more than tripled while the note circulation nearly quadrupled. Increase in central bank foreign reserves can easily be identified as a prime mover behind monetary expansion in the first half of the war while central bank domestic credit had strong impact in the second part. The later part is also characterised by stronger expansion than the first. For Germany the modest price increase reflects only the official controlled prices. Black markets were a large part of the economy and their prices are not included in the official price statistics. In Britain food prices were regulated there was never a substantial black market. Balderston, T., War Finance and Inflation in Britain and Germany, 1914 -1918 , The Economic History Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, May 1989 comparison, the annual growth rate 1893 to 1913 was 5.4 percent. The single highest growth rate experienced during the gold standard period had been the 14 percent increase in 1879. The mirror of monetary expansion was of course inflation. In the course of the war the domestic purchasing power of the krone fell to one third of its pre-war level. 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 Source The prime instrument of monetary policy, the bank rate, was kept within the pre-war gold standard range for the duration of the war, between 4.5 and 6 percent, as seen in figure 3.
However, there was a slight tendency to change the rate more frequently than in the pre-war period. 24 The combination of a pre-war interest rate level and high inflation resulted in the real interest rated being highly negative reaching peaking in 1918 at more than -30 %.
SOURCES TO MONETARY GROWTH
Having sketched the development of key variables, we move on to a closer examination of the sources of monetary growth during the war. Here we apply a simple book-keeping framework, similar to the one used by Friedman and Schwartz, on quarterly Norwegian data. 25 However, due to data inconsistency we only divide growth rate of M2 into two causal categories; non-central bank domestic sources and monetary base. 24 From August 1914 to the end of the war Norges Bank changed the bank rate ten times. The bank rate was not changed in 1918, so these ten changes came within a period of less than three and a half years. In addition the bank rate was changed three times before August 1914. In comparison the bank rate was changed only twentyone times in the fourteen years from the turn of the century up until 1914. 25 Friedman, Milton, and Schwartz, Anna J., A Monetary History of the United States, 1867 -1960 , Princeton UP 1963 In this model the sources of changes in the stock of money (M2) are attributed to the separate movements in three variables; the monetary base; the ratio between bank deposits and currency held by the public (the currency ratio); and the ratio between the deposits and the banks' own reserves (the reserve ratio). The currency ratio can be seen as reflecting the behaviour or the public, while the reserve ratio that of the banking sector. The movement in the monetary base variable (currency in addition to deposits in the central bank This was probably to some extent the result of reduced earnings in the export sectors.
However, as figure 5 below demonstrates Norwegian banks continued to amass foreign claims at a rate that clearly surpassed the modest reduction in central bank foreign reserves.
Moreover, firms and individuals, for which we have no solid data, continued to increase their foreign deposits. The most likely explanation is that the reduced value of foreign currencies in Norwegian kroner and the anticipation of a return to pre-war parities, motivated banks, firms and members of the public to keep the money abroad. Figure 6 illustrates the development of gross foreign deposits of Norwegian private banks and the sterling exchange rate in kroner. The figure indicates that willingness to keep funds abroad was associated with a weak sterling rate. The only major exception is in late 1917 when both the sterling rate and foreign deposits take a dive. Contemporary Norwegian sources indicate that there was a temporarily shifting mood in the market with expectations of further falls in the value in sterling leading to a desire to remit money back. Farmand argued that while the low value of the currencies was the reason the money was still abroad, it was now time to bring the money home before the value of the currency dropped further.
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However, the mood changed again with the prospects of peace. Throughout 1918 foreign deposits and the sterling rate went upwards in tandem. Before we take a closer look at the constraints some more general observations are of importance for understanding the setting of central bank policy. Crucially, the formation of policy was strongly influenced by the time dimension, the perceptions about how long the war would last. Although probably only the most optimistic really believed that the soldiers would be home for Christmas, very few in 1914 envisioned a war that the war would drag on for four years at such a high cost, measured in terms of human loss and economic disruption. The challenges were of a pressing nature, in the Norwegian case notably concerning essential supplies and the relationship with the major powers. The time dimension therefore ultimately gave rise to ad-hoc solutions, some more ill-advised than others. When the war dragged on, the sum of ad-hoc solutions totted up, without the government or central bank developing more long-term strategies for counterbalancing them. One explanation for this is the stubbornness of the belief that an imminent peace was always on the cards, another that policy continuously was formed by on-going events and challenges beyond the control of Norwegian authorities, notably the progressively more restrictive supply policy and coercive attitude of the United Kingdom and later the United States.
Related to the time dimension is the overall understanding of the war as an extraordinary state that warranted unorthodox policies, but did not change the fundamental understanding of society or economics. Although the following post-war reconstruction might be painful, peace would eventually bring about a return to the world as it had been. In Norway, the financial press managed to predict what reconstruction would imply with foresight from quite early on: The shortages created by the war would be eliminated and capital for reconstruction would be in short supply, leading to a downward pressure on prices and the value of securities. 33 What contemporary observers and policymakers failed to foresee was not the nature of the coming economic slump and reconstruction process, but rather the magnitude of the challenges and how the war, acting as a transformation agent, had changed society's ability to meet these.
Viewed with hindsight -either from the perspectives of the 1920s or from today -it seems rather obvious that Norges Bank and the overall economic policy during the war were facing problems. For contemporary policy makers this was not all that evident. The monetary expansion, in particular in the later part of the war, was of course a source of concern, but could easily be understood as mirroring forces beyond the control of the bank. What made the strongest impression on the leadership of Norges Bank was the surprising strength of the Norwegian war economy. The dim prospects envisioned at the onset of war failed to materialise. Instead Norway, as discussed earlier, experienced something of a bonanza driven by the prosperous fortunes of the export sectors. The foreign exchange reserves reached unprecedented heights, exporters built up impressive holdings abroad and from the autumn of 1915 the krone was steadily quoted above the par value both of sterling and the American dollar, the only major remaining gold back currency. Until 1918, with the exception of the war months of 1914, the foreign reserve backing of the circulating note stock was above the 33 Farmand, 13 March 1915 , 11 September 1915 sheer force of the numbers, Norges Bank could easily be lulled into overvaluing their strength with regard to future challenges. Moreover, even in the parts of the financial press that voiced the strongest concerns over the jobbing economy, the faith in Norges Bank and its leadership remained solid. In connection with governor Bomhoff celebrating his 75 th birthday, even the otherwise critical journal Farmand noted:
"Despite his high age, he (Bomhoff) carries out responsible work as governor of Norges Bank with undiminished force. In these difficult times his great experience and wise leadership of the country's monetary system is of invaluable importance for our nation."
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For long periods Norges Bank appeared unconcerned with the overall state of affairs.
Although also the bank turned progressively more critical to the development of the jobbing economy, this related to the conduct of monetary policy. Although the bank already in early 1916 warned that "(...)the large earnings of some industries tempt many to reckless speculation and frivolity", the limited measures undertaken to dampen the boom were clearly insufficient to have any major impact on the speculative fever. 36 To understand the lack of overall concern we have to turn to the intellectual constraints of the bank leadership inherited from the pre-war experience.
From the examination of the monetary statistics earlier in this article, we know that the development of the note circulation ought to have served as an early warning. Even more so, as this was data that Norges Bank gathered on a weekly basis and had a tradition of watching very carefully. However, this did not happen. In the annual report for 1914 the increased note circulation was explained in terms of increased demand for means of payments after the outbreak of war and a desire among the private and saving banks to increase their cash holdings. In this pressing situation, Norges Bank had supported these legitimate demands for money by rediscounting without reduction given sufficient security. 37 The next year, the continued increase in the note circulation was due "mostly to increased prices because of the war" as well as the flourishing times for the Norwegian export sectors and costs related to the armed neutrality. Moreover the report noted that average central bank discounting was below the level of 1914, but probably somewhat higher than the war months of that year.
Furthermore, the metallic coverage of the note circulation was above the pre-war level.
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Responding to the criticism made by professor Jaeger at a meeting in Statsøkonomisk forening (the Economic Society), governor Bomhoff argued forcefully against the policy of the bank driving price upwards:
"(...) It was not the not the money stock that had increased prices. The increased price level was due to a number of factors. First, naturally the fact that supply was insufficient to meet demand. Production had been strongly reduced in many countries due to the war, while the consumption of many necessities had become so much higher. In addition, when taking into account the high freight rates, the export bans in many countries and the constant risk that our ships might be torpedoed or hit by sea mines, a period of high prices was ok 39 . Moreover, the major fortunes earned in recent times had increased the desire to purchase and thereby demand. In this manner more notes had entered the circulation than what would otherwise have been the case. Furthermore, a not inconsiderable part of the money had been employed in the setting-up of new businesses and industrial plants, which for the main part had to be considered beneficial for our society. These demanded much money in circulation both for purchases and to meet the high wage given."
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In the report for 1917, Norges Bank also states that the increased price level resulted in higher note circulation. 41 What is striking with these statements from the bank leadership is the total lack of acceptance that there might be a causal relationship between monetary expansion and inflation. Here, the bank remained solidly within the pre-war tradition that prices reflected changing business cycle fortunes. The war increased demand and economic activity, resulting in higher prices. As the manager of the domestic currency Norges Bank only responded to the quite natural increase in the demand for means of payments that followed. Not doing so would have led to unnecessary stoppages and would have been contrary to the bank's obligation to serve the public. Moreover, the view of inflation as purely a war-related phenomenon was an idea that was shared by others. Norges Bank repeatedly had to warn the branches against discounting speculation papers, a Closely associated to business cycle thinking and the unmistaken belief that a prudent central bank could not cause inflation, was the implications that this way of thinking had for the future. With the return to normality, prices would return in line and the bank to its traditional role. Moreover, given the strong increase in its own reserves and the private wealth accumulated in foreign currencies on private hands, Norges Bank believed it was better equipped than ever to manage the challenges of post-war adjustment and the coming restoration of the gold standard. In this we probably find the fundamental explanation of why Norges Bank remained so confident and so little worried despite the monetary turmoil.
Throughout the war, a group of economists led by professors Jaeger and Aarum, influenced by Swedish economists argued the case of the quantitative school and proscribed how the bank could stem the monetary expansion. In particular, they advocated sterilising the foreign exchange inflow and using the bank rate more aggressively.
As we have seen the major cause of monetary expansion in the first two years of the war was the remittance of export earnings. Jaeger and Aarum strongly argued that this inflow led to inflation and ought to be stopped. 46 One particularly critical point was the only major formal part of the gold standard legislation still in place, the bank's obligation to buy gold at the old pre-war parity of 2480 kroner per kilo. Although the risk of war and the gold export ban introduced in most country had widened the gold points, i.e. the range the currency fluctuated within, the commitment to buy gold efficiently created a ceiling for how strong the Norwegian krone could become. If the krone became too strong, foreign creditors had the incentive to get an exemption from the export ban and settle the claim in gold valued at the pre-war rate. This also happened on a number of occasions, as the increase in vault in gold of Norges Bank testifies to.
47
Norges Bank failed to see the inflationary impact of its purchases of gold and foreign currency. Bomhoff argued strongly that the bank and the country needed these reserves both more influenced by the actions undertaken by the Swedish Riksbank in this respect than the professorial criticism, did Norges Bank ask the government to lift the obligation which the parliament subsequently granted.
In retrospect, this is probably one of the areas where Norges Bank could have done something efficiently to stem monetary expansion. An early removal of the gold buying obligation would have led to a swifter appreciation of the krone and increased the incentives not to remit. Moreover, had Norges Bank also taken a more withdrawn attitude towards purchasing foreign currency in general, this would have been most helpful in arresting the expansion. Basically, in the currency market Norges Bank followed the pre-war tradition inspired by its role at the manager of the country's foreign exchange reserve to serve the demands of public. In the early war years this implied buying whatever currency the public offered. Had Norges Bank restricted its purchases to its own needs in the strictest sense, andeven better -also let the government take care of its own purchases of currency in the open market, this would have further strengthened the appreciation of the krone. In addition to lowering the pace of monetary expansion, appreciation would have had the added benefit of reducing the strong inflationary impetus stemming from the import bill. Granted, the competitive power of the export sector would have been weakened, but in the seller's market that existed at the time, this would almost certainly have had only slight impact on volumes.
The negative impact on earnings would probably have been to the better for the economy as a whole.
Of course, there were limits to how efficient such a policy could have been, chief among them the willingness on the hand of economic agents to hold claims abroad. We have seen how, after the summer of 1916, such claims accumulated strongly. Moreover, Norwegian stocks and public bonds to the value of some 250 million kroner were bought home during the war. 49 Had Norges Bank managed to force that trend to occur earlier, much could have been different.
Throughout the war Norges Bank kept the bank rate within the 4.5 to 6.5 percent range. Given the inflation level the result was highly negative real interest rates and strong pro-cyclical bias. This was nothing particular for Norway, as other neutral countries also kept their rates low. According to the contemporary Swedish economist, professor Cassel this was an example of how the neutrals followed the lead of the countries at war. He argues that the bank rate was subordinated the regulation of the domestic trade and industry both in war and neutral countries. In the neutral countries the low bank rate in fact mainly worked as a support to the war countries. Higher interest rates in neutral countries would have encouraged exporters to bring their earnings home and would have made it more difficult for the belligerents to fund the war.
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The bank rate policy of Norges Bank was not an expression of a desire to fund the European carnage, although Cassel probably is spot on in describing the effects of the policy.
Rather, the policy reflected a pre-war approach to interest rate setting and domestic concerns over the effect of rates on industry and commerce. The two subsequent reductions in the bank rate in May 1916 -bringing the rate down from 5.5 to 4.5 percent -illustrate the impact of the pre-war thinking in at nutshell. In the spring of 1916 foreign currency flowed in at a high pace -the foreign exchange reserves increased by more than 50 % from end of December to the end of April -resulting in a very loose money market. In June Farmand commented the state of the money market:
"The money market continues to be extremely liquid. Very large amounts are daily transferred through Norges Bank back and forth between the country's private banks and saving banks, because they all have so much money, that they do not know how to place them at a not too bad rate of return." "The reason that the bank rate remains at the current level of 6 % was that in the present situation such a high rate is a double-edged sword. A major part of our businessmen have not been taking part in the worshipping of the golden bull calf, but are burdened by hardship. It is this group, the bank -as far as possibleattempts to shield from the further burden of higher interest rates. Moreover, a bank rate increase would not have much impact on the gold movements nor will it restrain the unhealthy speculation unless the increase is far beyond the normal". A higher interest rate would probably have had a cooling effect on monetary expansion and prices, although the impact on the exchange rate to some extent would have counterbalanced this by intensifying remittances and even speculative short-term capital movements. What is something of a paradox here is of course that Norges Bank at the time believed that international money was not sensitive to interest rate changes because of the inconvertibility of notes. Thus, had Norges Bank introduced a bank rate hike, they would have done so without taking into account the impact on short-term capital movements. This, they did not do. So instead of meeting the speculative boom by the efficient bank rate weapon,
Norges Bank had to take refuge in moral persuasion and warnings over the danger of speculation discussed earlier. However, moral persuasion, with neither a stick nor a carrot, seldom gives any results.
The legacy of the past, as discussed above, clearly made Norges Bank less inclined to understand how the world had changed. Although accepting the challenges created by the war, Norges Bank, neither from a theoretical nor from a practical point of view, recognised the implication for policy. Intellectual constraints rather than incompetence led the bank astray. However, one particular damaging area of policy, the relationship with the government, cannot be explained in terms of the constraints of the past. Before the war Norges Bank acted as the foremost banker of the government, but did not extend credit to the government. In line with the thinking of the gold standard era, an advance to the government was regarded as bad form and exactly the type of transfer that the bank was created to avoid. Britain did not hesitate to use coercive power and threats of cutting off supplies to achieve her end. Norges Bank accepted her national obligation, although this turned into the start of the rapid increase in central bank discounting. Norges Bank could have resisted more strongly, but the honourable thing was to do whatever possible to support the nation when its livelihood and welfare was at stake.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The policy of Norges Bank during the war must be understood in light of intellectual constraints and the willingness to be at the nation's service in a time of great peril.
Freed from the chains of the external anchor, the legacies of the gold standard experience continued to influence policy. Chief among these was the belief in the prudent central bank and its role in society. The fact that Norges Bank in reality came deviate from this inner image was not something the leadership with governor Bomhoff dwelled much upon. The times were indeed extraordinary, but there was no reason to be overly worried. Moreover, peace would lead to a restoration of the golden anchor and put prices back. Both Norges Bank as a central bank and Norway as a nation had been strengthened throughout the war and were well prepared for the future.
There is an inner intellectual coherence in the world view of Norges Bank's leadership. Does this knowledge remove Norges Bank from its part in the responsibility for the Norwegian monetary-war experience and subsequent hardship of the 1920s? No, but now we can at least understand why they acted like they did.
